On the incrementality of pragmatic processing: An ERP investigation of informativeness and pragmatic abilities by Nieuwland, Mante S. et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the incrementality of pragmatic processing: An ERP
investigation of informativeness and pragmatic abilities
Citation for published version:
Nieuwland, MS, Ditman, T & Kuperberg, GR 2010, 'On the incrementality of pragmatic processing: An ERP
investigation of informativeness and pragmatic abilities' Journal of Memory and Language, vol 63, no. 3, pp.
324-346. DOI: 10.1016/j.jml.2010.06.005
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.jml.2010.06.005
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of Memory and Language
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Nieuwland, M. S., Ditman, T., & Kuperberg, G. R. (2010). On the incrementality of pragmatic processing: An
ERP investigation of informativeness and pragmatic abilities. Journal of Memory and Language, 63(3), 324-346.
10.1016/j.jml.2010.06.005
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
 1 
 
 
On the incrementality of pragmatic processing: An ERP investigation of informativeness 
and pragmatic abilities 
 
Mante S. Nieuwland 
1, 2,3
, Tali Ditman
2, 3
 & Gina R. Kuperberg 
2, 3, 4 
 
1 
Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language, Paseo Mikeletegi 69, 2nd Floor, 
20009, Donostia, Spain 
2 
Department of Psychology, Tufts University, 490 Boston Avenue, Medford, MA 02155, 
USA 
3 
MGH/MIT/HMS Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Bldg 149, 13th 
Street, Charlestown, Massachusetts 02129, USA 
4 
Department of Psychiatry, Massachusetts General Hospital, Bldg 149, 13th Street, 
Charlestown, MA 02129, USA 
 
Date: June 22
th
, 2010 
Correspondence: 
Mante S. Nieuwland, Ph.D. 
Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language 
Paseo Mikeletegi 69, 2nd Floor, 20009 Donostia, Spain 
Phone/Fax: +34-943-309-202/052 
E-mail: m.nieuwland@bcbl.eu 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
 2 
 
ABSTRACT 
In two event-related potential (ERP) experiments, we determined to what extent Grice’s 
maxim of informativeness as well as pragmatic ability contributes to the incremental 
build-up of sentence meaning, by examining the impact of underinformative versus 
informative scalar statements (e.g. “Some people have lungs/pets, and…”) on the N400 
event-related potential (ERP), an electrophysiological index of semantic processing. In 
Experiment 1, only pragmatically skilled participants (as indexed by the Autism Quotient 
Communication subscale) showed a larger N400 to underinformative statements. In 
Experiment 2, this effect disappeared when the critical words were unfocused so that the 
local underinformativeness went unnoticed (e.g., “Some people have lungs that…”). Our 
results suggest that, while pragmatic scalar meaning can incrementally contribute to 
sentence comprehension, this contribution is dependent on contextual factors, whether 
these are derived from individual pragmatic abilities or the overall experimental context.
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INTRODUCTION 
According one of the key principles of pragmatics, addressees by default presume that 
speakers communicate efficiently by uttering messages that are informative (Grice, 1975; 
Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This so-called conversational maxim of quantity is based on 
the idea that communication has evolved as a cooperative effort, and it often implicitly 
shapes our communicative interactions (e.g., Engelhardt, Bailey & Ferreira, 2006; see 
also Clark, 1996). Of course, that does not mean that everything that we say or write is 
genuinely informative. We easily adjust our expectations to who we are talking to (e.g., 
children, people who know more or less than we do), reflecting the fact that what is 
informative or relevant to one individual might be trivial or irrelevant to another. 
Moreover, there is abundant literature to suggest that individuals can vary greatly in their 
abilities to produce and comprehend pragmatic language, which could mean that some 
people are simply more focused on the logic of utterances than others (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
2008). 
Although Grice’s account of pragmatic principles was not intended to serve as a 
psychological model of cognitive processing (see Bach, 2005; Bezuidenhout & Cutting, 
2002), it may be that the addressee’s default presumptions have important ramifications 
for how language is processed online (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004). One way in which 
Grice’s maxim of quantity may play out in online sentence processing is by influencing 
the addressee’s expectations of what kind of words will come next (e.g., Federmeier, 
2007; Van Berkum, 2009). For example, following the sentence fragment “Some people 
have…”, the addressee might expect the upcoming word to denote something that not all 
people have (e.g., ‘pets’, ‘tattoos’), instead of something that all people possess (e.g., 
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‘lungs’, ‘bodies’). As a result, one can hypothesize that trivially true, underinformative 
statements (e.g., “Some people have lungs”) incur semantic processing costs because they 
deviate from the addressee’s expectations. In the two experiments reported below, we 
determined to what extent Grice’s maxim of informativeness contributes to the 
incremental build-up of sentence meaning. Specifically, we explored differences in 
individual’s reliance on this maxim for interpretation, and also investigated the role of 
general contextual factors on the processing of underinformative utterances. We 
addressed these issues by examining the impact of underinformative versus informative 
scalar sentences (e.g. “Some people have lungs/pets.…”) on the N400 event-related 
potential (ERP), an electrophysiological index of semantic processing (Kutas & Hillyard, 
1980, 1984). 
 Ever since Aristotle´s science of logic, quantifiers and logical operators have been 
important windows into human reasoning, and have maintained a crucial role in logic and 
linguistics because of their association with truth-value (e.g., see Gamut, 1991). The 
scalar quantifier ‘some’ has received much attention because it allows for two disparate 
readings: a pragmatic interpretation and a logical interpretation. The pragmatic 
interpretation approximates to ‘some but not all’ or ‘only some’. This interpretation 
constitutes a conversational inference, by which language comprehenders attribute an 
implicit meaning beyond the logical or literal meaning. This inference is termed a scalar 
inference or scalar implicature because it is thought that comprehenders base this 
pragmatic interpretation on the assumption that the communicator had a reason for not 
using a more informative or stronger term on the same quantity scale (some < many < 
all; see Horn, 1972). In other words, comprehenders assume that the communicator 
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would have said ‘all’ if he/she thought ‘all’ was true, and assume that the communicator 
says ‘some’ because he/she thinks that stronger expressions like ‘many’ and ‘all’ are 
false. 
The logical interpretation approximates to ‘at least some’ or ‘some and possibly 
all’. This interpretation makes sense when communicators use the expression ‘some’ 
when they lack all the relevant information (for example, “Some guests are coming to my 
party, but not everybody has RSVPed yet”, in which case it is possible that many or all 
invitees will come to the party), or when they are not referring to a specific subset (e.g., 
“Some people were crossing the street”). 
Importantly, the pragmatic and logical interpretation may yield different truth 
values. For a simple, informative statement like “Some people have pets”, each 
interpretation yields an outcome that is true with respect to world knowledge; it is true 
that ‘some but not all people have pets’, consistent with the pragmatic interpretation, and 
it is also true that there exist people with pets, consistent with the logical interpretation. 
However, for an underinformative statement like “Some people have lungs”, whereas the 
logical interpretation yields a true outcome (because people with lungs do exist), the 
pragmatic interpretation yields a false outcome (because all people have lungs, not just 
some). The fact that ‘some’ may yield disparate truth-values can be used to examine how 
language comprehenders apply their pragmatic knowledge during sentence 
comprehension and establish sentence truth-value (for reviews see Noveck & Reboul, 
2008; Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Sedivy, 2007). 
Theoretical accounts of how people deal with scalar quantifiers predominantly 
differ in whether they assume that scalar inferences are generated by default or whether 
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scalar inferences are context-dependent (see also Geurts, 2009; Horn, 2006; Recanati, 
2003). In what has been dubbed the Levinsonian account, scalar inferences are generated 
automatically upon encountering ‘some’. The idea behind this is that, because the 
pragmatic meaning of scalars is so dominant in our language use, it has become 
‘lexicalized’ (see Levinson, 2000; for related accounts see Chierchia, 2004; Gadzar, 
1979) such that the intended message can be efficiently communicated. The pragmatic 
meaning, however, can be cancelled when the subsequent context requires so. For 
example, upon encountering the sentence “John wanted some of the cookies”, addressees 
automatically generate the pragmatic interpretation and interpret the sentences as 
meaning John wanted some, but not all, of the cookies. However, at a later point, upon 
encountering the sentence “In fact, he wanted all of them”, they revise their initial 
interpretation to be consistent with the logical interpretation. According to this account, it 
is this undoing of the scalar inference that is costly. 
In contrast, proponents of Relevance Theory have posited that the generation of 
scalar inferences is chiefly a function of whether the inference is required to meet the 
addressee’s standard of relevance (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Carston, 1998). The 
logical interpretation of ‘some’ (i.e., “some and possibly all”) could very well lead to a 
satisfying interpretation of the utterance, but the discourse context may require the 
addressee to derive a scalar inference to arrive at the pragmatic interpretation. Since this 
pragmatic interpretation involves ‘narrowing’ (negation of the stronger expressions 
‘many’ and ‘all’), it constitutes a fully fledged inferential process which requires 
processing time and effort beyond the ‘easier’ logical interpretation.  
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Neither the Levinsonian framework nor Relevance Theory constitutes a 
psychological model of scalar inferences with explicit implications for processing. Yet, 
experimental psychologists have tried to infer testable predictions about the time course 
of scalar inferences. It has been argued that if scalar inferences are generated 
automatically, as advocated in the Levinsonian account, they are also generated relatively 
rapidly and their cancellation would incur additional processing costs (e.g., Bott & 
Noveck, 2004). In contrast, if scalar inferences are truly context-dependent, then they 
would incur processing costs in situations where they are not licensed by the context. 
According to Breheny, Katsos and Williams (2006), Relevance Theory predicts that in a 
neutral context (i.e., without a discourse context that biases towards either a logical or a 
pragmatic interpretation), no scalar inference will initially be computed, and only when 
the logical interpretation is deemed insufficient will addressees invest additional 
cognitive effort to generate a scalar inference. 
To examine the time course for the generation of scalar inferences, behavioral 
research on scalar inferences has often used the sentence-verification paradigm (e.g., Bott 
& Noveck, 2004; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Feeney, Scafton, Duckworth 
& Handley, 2004; Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse & Geurts, 2008; De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; for reviews, see Bezuidenhout & Morris, 2004; Noveck & Reboul, 
2008; Noveck & Sperber, 2004, 2007; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Sedivy, 2007). In 
sentence-verification tasks participants are asked to judge the truth of a statement, and in 
speeded sentence-verification tasks participants are asked to do this as fast as possible. 
Because the logical and pragmatic interpretation of informative sentences yield identical 
truth-values, the dependent measure of whether a scalar inference has been made is 
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whether participants respond ‘false’ to an underinformative scalar statement (e.g., “Some 
people have lungs”). An often reported finding is that participants who respond ‘false’ to 
underinformative sentences are slower than those who respond ‘true’ (e.g., Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Rips, 1975). This is the case regardless of 
whether participants are explicitly instructed to respond ‘false’ or whether they 
spontaneously decide to do so (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004). These results have been 
interpreted as suggesting that scalar inferences are associated with additional processing 
costs and result from a delayed decision process (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck & 
Posada, 2003; Noveck & Reboul, 2008). 
Although using a sentence-verification task makes intuitive sense when dealing 
with truth-value, its interpretation is subject to a number of important caveats, as has 
already been noted by several researchers (Feeney et al., 2004; Grodner et al., 2010; 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009). For example, evaluating the logical meaning of an 
underinformative sentence may be inherently easier than evaluating its pragmatic 
meaning because one needs only one or two examples to verify the logical meaning (one 
or two people that have lungs) whereas one may need to do a more extended analysis to 
falsify the pragmatic meaning (e.g., search of, and failing to find counterexamples in 
memory; see also Grodner et al., 2010; Huang & Snedeker, 2009). Thus, it may not 
necessarily be the case that generating the pragmatic meaning requires additional 
processing effort and time, but rather refuting it. Another important concern is that 
speeded sentence verification is a relatively unnatural task that may encourage 
participants to ignore their pragmatic knowledge (Feeney et al., 2004), and it is hardly 
representative of how people process language in everyday life. Importantly, people who 
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do generate scalar inferences are also slower in other conditions (e.g., Noveck & Posada, 
2003), suggestive of a more general difference in task-related strategic processing. 
Finally, reaction times in verification tasks are generally quite slow, over 600 ms when 
statements are presented word by word (e.g., Noveck & Posada, 2003, Bott & Noveck, 
2004) or even in the order of seconds when sentences are presented as a whole (e.g., 
Pijnacker et al., 2008; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007). In this regard, the results from 
verification tasks should be taken to reflect the combination of early stages of language 
processing as well as the output of downstream decision processes that follow them (e.g. 
Kounios & Holcomb, 1992). 
Recently, researchers have overcome these problems by using a more indirect, 
high temporal resolution measure of scalar processing – the visual-world paradigm. 
Using this paradigm, Huang & Snedeker (2009) recorded eye-movements while 
participants received auditory instructions such as “Click on the girl that has some of the 
socks” or “Click on the girl that has all of the soccer balls” in the presence of a display in 
which one girl had two socks from the four socks that were present in the display, and 
another girl had all three soccer balls that were present in the display. The temporary 
referential ambiguity in the instruction at the point of ‘some’ could, in principle, be 
resolved immediately if participants made a scalar inference that would restrict ‘some’ to 
a proper subset. Participants, however, were substantially delayed, to ‘some’, but not 
when the instruction contained the word ‘all’. Based on this observation, Huang and 
Snedeker argued that ‘pragmatic’ scalar inferences are delayed relative to the ‘semantic’ 
logical interpretation (see also Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny et al., 2006; De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; Noveck & Posada, 2003).  
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However, Grodner and colleagues (Grodner, Klein, Carbary & Tanenhaus, 2010) 
note that ‘some’ is not unambiguously associated with a scalar inference (e.g., “Click on 
the girl with some socks” does not imply other socks are in the discourse), and that it was 
the partitive construction ‘of the’ that allowed for identification of the target in the Huang 
and Snedeker study. In contrast, for all, the quantifier itself was sufficient to identify the 
target. In a related study by Grodner et al. (2010) that circumvented these and some 
additional issues, scalar inference associated with pragmatic-some was not delayed 
relative to expressions that did not require a scalar inference. Thus, in contrast to the 
Huang & Snedeker (2009) results, the Grodner et al. results suggest that the pragmatic 
meaning of scalar expressions is rapidly available. 
 In the present study on scalar processing, we employed another indirect, high 
temporal resolution measure of language comprehension, namely Event-Related 
Potentials (ERPs). An important advantage of ERPs is that they provide both quantitative 
and qualitative information about language processing well in advance of (and without 
the principled need for) an explicit behavioral response (e.g., Van Berkum, 2004). In 
particular, we focus on the N400 ERP component (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984; see 
Kutas, Van Petten & Kluender, 2006, for review), a negative deflection in the ERP that 
emerges somewhere between 150 and 300 milliseconds after the onset of a word and that 
peaks at about 400 ms, with a maximum over the back of the head (i.e., electrodes at 
parietal locations). The N400 is, in principle, elicited by every content word, and its 
amplitude decreases in size and in a gradual manner when the word fits the context better 
(e.g., Kutas et al., 2006; Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005). 
A differential effect of two conditions on the N400 amplitude is referred to as an N400 
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effect. The functional significance of the N400 is still under debate (e.g., Kutas et al., 
2006; Lau, Phillips & Poeppel, 2008; Van Berkum, 2009), but there is a general 
consensus that its amplitude reflects the fit between the lexical-semantic meaning of an 
incoming word and the interaction between linguistic context (at the level of single 
words, sentences and discourse) with information stored in memory (e.g., semantic 
memory, real-world knowledge and pragmatic knowledge of what a speaker is likely to 
say), henceforth referred to as ‘semantic fit’
1
. The results from recent ERP studies have 
shown that the interaction between context and real-world knowledge can lead people to 
generate expectations about the semantic properties of specific upcoming words (e.g., De 
Long, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005; Federmeier, 2007; Van Berkum, 2009; Van Berkum et al., 
2005), although it may be that, under other circumstances, the three-way mapping 
process is initiated only once the word is encountered. Importantly, in a recent study on 
negation processing, we showed that the N400 ERP is also sensitive to the 
informativeness of an utterance (Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). In this study, 
participants read sentences that were true but underinformative due to pragmatically 
unlicensed negation (e.g., “Bulletproof vests aren’t very dangerous…”, in which case 
negation is used to deny something that makes no sense to begin with, namely that 
bulletproof vests are dangerous). Critical words (‘dangerous’) in these sentences elicited 
an increased N400 responses in the same way that false sentences did. In contrast, true 
sentences that contained pragmatically licensed negation (e.g., “With proper equipment, 
                                                 
1
 This view can be distinguished from one in which the N400 reflects the combinatorial process of 
integrating a critical word with the preceding context or of assessing the plausibility of the resulting 
proposition (see Kuperberg, 2007, Lau et al., 2008; Van Berkum, 2009, for discussion). 
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scuba-diving isn’t very dangerous…”) elicited N400 responses that were 
indistinguishable from those elicited by true affirmative sentences (e.g., “With proper 
equipment, scuba-diving is very safe…”). These results suggest that pragmatic 
knowledge of what is an informative thing to say influences an early stage of semantic 
processing, and may even contribute to building up broad pragmatic expectancies about 
what upcoming words are likely to be encountered. 
There has been one previous study investigating whether the N400 is modulated 
by scalar inferences. Noveck and Posada (2003) recorded readers’ electrophysiological 
responses to sentence-final words in underinformative sentences (e.g., “Some elephants 
have trunks”), patently false sentences (e.g., “Some crows have radios”) and patently true 
sentences (e.g., “Some houses have bricks”). Similar to previous behavioral studies, 
participants were asked to make a speeded sentence verification response following each 
sentence. The results indicated that patently true and patently false sentences elicited a 
larger N400 ERP than underinformative sentences, and that the N400 responses to 
underinformative sentences were not modulated by whether participants responded true 
or false to these sentences. Consistent with previous behavioral findings, the reaction 
time data indicated that those participants who made scalar inferences (i.e. responded 
‘false’ to underinformative sentences) were much slower to respond than those who 
followed a literal interpretation (i.e., responded ‘true’ to underinformative sentences). 
Critically, however, participants who made scalar inferences were much slower in all 
conditions, suggesting that these participants were using a more cautious strategy overall 
(see Feeney et al., 2004, for a related discussion). Noveck and Posada interpreted the 
smaller N400 for underinformative sentences, in combination with the slow time course 
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of scalar implicatures, as being inconsistent with a Levinsonian account. They also 
suggested that scalar implicatures may likely be the product of a post-semantic decision 
process, that, once the critical word has been encountered, computes the truth-value of 
the complete proposition, whereas the initial stage of semantic processing after the 
critical word is determined only by simple lexical-semantic relationships (e.g., see also 
Fischler et al., 1983; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992). Later accounts by Noveck and 
colleagues suggest that, under certain conditions, the pragmatic scalar meaning may be 
generated without having to traverse through a logical interpretation first (Noveck & 
Sperber, 2007). However, the general idea that pragmatic processing costs are incurred 
after lexico-semantic processing is complete has persisted in some models of language 
processing (e.g. Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky, 2008; Cutler & Clifton, 1999; 
Fodor, 1983; Forster, 1979; Regel, Gunter & Friederici, 2010 ). 
Several problems with interpreting the initial ERP study by Noveck and Poseda. 
First, the materials in the different conditions were not matched or counterbalanced, and 
the words were presented in at a very fast pace (a presentation duration of 200 ms per 
word and an inter-word interval of 40 ms, which is about half of what is customarily used 
in ERP research using serial visual presentation
2
). Second, they employed a sentence-
                                                 
2
 The short presentation duration that was used by Noveck and Posada (and by Bott & 
Noveck, 2004), although constant, may mimic the speed of the natural reading rate more 
closely. However, using these durations in the RSVP procedure, which does not allow 
backtracking or slowing down, can cause readers to experience difficulties with normal 
sentence comprehension (see Camblin, Ledoux, Boudewyn, Gordon & Swaab, 2007), 
and note that word-by-word self-paced reading times are generally over at least 350 ms 
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verification task that may have evoked decision-related positive ERPs that overlap in 
time and scalp distribution with the N400, and that may obscure modulations of the N400 
(e.g., Kuperberg, 2007). In light of these concerns, it is important to note that patently 
false sentences did not evoke larger N400 responses than patently true sentences, whereas 
violations of real-world knowledge have consistently been associated with larger N400 
responses in other studies (e.g., Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos & Perry, 1983; 
Fischler, Childers, Achariyapaopan, & Perry 1984; Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen & 
Petersson, 2004; Hald, Steenbeek-Planting & Hagoort, 2007; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 
2008). This is problematic because these violations were included to establish a 
benchmark comparison for the main results. 
In the current study, we addressed some of these concerns and used ERPs to 
examine how rapidly different individuals use their pragmatic knowledge of what is an 
informative versus uninformative thing to say during the processing of scalar sentences. 
We compared ERP responses elicited by critical words in underinformative scalar 
statements (e.g., ”Some people have lungs, …”) to those elicited by critical words in 
informative scalar statements (e.g., ”Some people have pets, …’’, see Table 1 for more 
examples). If the pragmatic meaning of weak scalar quantifiers can be used incrementally 
during sentence comprehension (i.e., scalar inferences are made on-line), this may guide 
expectations about upcoming words so that readers and listeners will expect new input to 
be informative (e.g., Crain & Steedman, 1985; Altmann & Steedman 1988; Tanenhaus & 
Trueswell, 1995; see also MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994). Given that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
even for very short words (see Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; Ditman, Holcomb & 
Kuperberg, 2007a). 
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N400 is sensitive to how well a word fits the context based on both semantic and 
pragmatic constraints (Coulson, 2004; Kutas et al., 2006; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; 
Van Berkum, 2009; Van Berkum, Van den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008), this 
incremental account predicts that critical words in an underinformative statement would 
yield a larger N400 than in an informative statement. 
In contrast, if the pragmatic meaning of weak scalar quantifiers is not readily 
available when readers encounter the critical word, then the N400 ERP would not be 
sensitive to whether the statement is informative or underinformative. Rather, sentence 
processing and modulation of the N400 may be driven purely by lexico-semantic 
relationships (e.g., Otten & Van Berkum, 2007; Van Petten, 1993; Van Petten, Weckerly, 
McIsaac, & Kutas, 1997; for review, see Kutas et al., 2006). Because critical words in the 
underinformative condition (e.g., ‘lungs’) had a stronger lexical-semantic relationship to 
the main noun phrase in the preceding phrase (e.g., ‘people’) than in the informative 
condition (supported by their higher values on a Latent Semantic Analysis, LSA 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997), see Methods section), this would predict a smaller N400 to 
informative than non-informative sentences (as shown by Noveck and Poseda, 2003).  
This prediction also follows from Grice’s original account (for discussion see Geurts, 
2009), and is generally consistent with models of language comprehension that assume 
that pragmatic factors come into play after an initial stage of ´context-free´, linguistic-
semantic processing (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Forster, 1979).  
Previous studies have reported that individuals can vary significantly in whether 
and how they apply their pragmatic knowledge (e.g., Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; 
Musolino & Lidz, 2006; Noveck, 2001; Schindele, Lüdtke & Kaup, in press; Stanovich & 
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West, 2001; Tager-Flusberg, 1981). Moreover, there have been several reports of 
individual differences in scalar inference generation (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Feeney 
et al., 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003), suggesting that different people may preferentially 
and consistently adopt either a literal or a pragmatic interpretation when asked to evaluate 
underinformative sentences. Our hypothesis, which we will describe in more detail 
below, is that individuals with good real-world pragmatic skills are, at least initially, 
relatively more sensitive to the pragmatic ‘violation’ of underinformativeness and 
therefore more likely to show a pragmatic N400 effect, whereas processing in people 
with poorer real-world pragmatic skills is more likely to be driven by pure lexico-
semantic association. 
As a caveat, inferences regarding the full extent of incremental scalar processing 
based on our paradigm are limited. As opposed to studies that have used the visual-world 
paradigm, our study was not designed to examine whether scalar inferences are generated 
immediately upon encountering the scalar quantifiers. A modulation of the N400 by 
informativeness in our study could be taken either as evidence that the processing 
consequences of the scalar quantifier either are rapidly computed upon encountering the 
critical word, or were perhaps computed before encountering the critical word. As argued 
by Van Berkum (2009), there are good reasons to assume that a pragmatic modulation of 
the N400 does not directly reflect a fully compositional enrichment process, but more 
likely indicates that the semantic and pragmatic consequences of the preceding discourse 
have been computed to serve as an interpretive background to retrieve word meaning (see 
also Kuperberg, Paczynski & Ditman, in press). Although our study was not specifically 
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designed to examine ERP responses to scalar quantifiers, we will report exploratory 
analyses that address these issues. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In the first of our two experiments, we examined electrophysiological responses to 
critical words in underinformative statements versus informative scalar statements, and 
used this measure to investigate individual differences in pragmatic processing. If scalar 
pragmatic inferences are generated incrementally during online sentence processing, 
critical words that render a statement trivial or underinformative should lead to additional 
semantic processing costs, and should elicit a larger N400 than critical words in 
informative statements – a pragmatic N400 effect (see also Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 
2008). If, on the other hand, pragmatic scalar information is not used incrementally 
during online processing, the N400 should not be larger to critical words in 
underinformative statements. In fact, given the closer lexico-semantic associations in 
underinformative than in informative sentences (people-lungs vs. people-pets), the N400 
may even be relatively attenuated in underinformative sentences. 
We also hypothesized that there may be individual variation in these patterns of 
N400 modulation, that may be predicted by variation in participants’ abilities to produce 
and comprehend pragmatic aspects of language in the real world (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 2000; Happé, 1993; Schindele et al., 2008; Tager-Flusberg, 
1981, 1985). We therefore obtained an independent measure of pragmatic language 
abilities of our participants in everyday life through the Communication subscale of the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (the AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
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Martin & Clubley, 2001) that quantifies an individual’s pragmatic skills on a continuum 
from autism to typicality. Of the five AQ subscales, the Communication subscale taps 
into pragmatic abilities most directly. Some examples of items from this subscale are 
“Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is 
polite”, “I find it hard to ‘read between the lines’ when someone is talking to me”, and 
“I am often the last to understand the point of a joke”. 
We predicted that individuals with good pragmatic abilities (as indexed by a low 
score on the AQ Communication subscale), would be relatively more sensitive to the 
pragmatic ‘violation’ of underinformativeness and more likely to show a pragmatic N400 
effect, as compared to less pragmatically skilled individuals (see Schindele et al., 2008, 
Pijnacker et al., 2008, for related hypotheses in participants with high-functioning autism 
or Asperger’s syndrome). This sensitivity may play out in several different ways. For 
example, individuals with good pragmatic abilities might generate pragmatic inferences 
more consistently, generate more robust inferences, they might be better at evaluating 
incoming words for informativeness, or perhaps even have a different task set than people 
with poor pragmatic skills. In the current study we cannot distinguish between these or 
other possibilities. Nevertheless, modulation of a pragmatic N400 effect by pragmatic 
abilities could provide evidence that such everyday communication problems may be, in 
part, driven by an impaired incremental use of pragmatic knowledge during language 
processing. 
In order to examine the specificity of these potential individual differences, we 
also included sentences that did not contain scalars, but that contained a word that had a 
relatively good semantic fit versus relatively poor semantic fit to the preceding sentence 
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context based on real-world knowledge; see Table 1 for examples). We predicted that 
words that were incongruous with real-world knowledge
3
 would produce a robust N400 
effect compared to words that were congruous with real-world knowledge (e.g., Kutas & 
Hillyard, 1984) in all individuals, regardless of their AQ-Communication scores. This 
allowed us to dissociate individual differences in incrementally recruiting pragmatic 
knowledge from the more general recruitment of real-world knowledge during online 
processing.  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-one right-handed Tufts students (17 males; mean age = 20.2 years) gave written 
informed consent. All were native English speakers, without neurological or psychiatric 
disorders. 
 
Materials 
We constructed 70 sentence pairs such that the underinformative and informative 
versions of each sentence pair were identical except for the critical word. Each sentence 
consisted of two clauses, and the first clause (the quantifier clause) always started with 
the quantifier ‘some’ and always ended with a comma after the critical word. We selected 
critical words so that replacing ‘some’ by the quantifier ‘all’ would yield a true statement 
                                                 
3
 We use the term ´incongruous with real-world knowledge´, but these sentences did not 
describe events that are impossible in the real-world, and this term only refers to the 
relative poor fit with real-world knowledge compared to the congruous sentences. 
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in the underinformative condition (e.g., “All people have lungs”), but a false statement in 
the informative condition (e.g., “All people have pets”). The second clause always 
contained at least three words and provided additional information about the critical 
word, the main NP in the scalar clause (e.g., ‘people’) or the scalar clause as a whole, and 
was created so that the complete sentence constituted a logically true statement in each 
condition. Critical words in the two conditions were approximately matched for average 
length in number of letters (underinformative, informative, M = 6.7/7.0, SD = 1.8/2.0) 
and log frequency (Francis & Kucera, 1976; underinformative, informative, M = 
1.73/1.91, SD = 2.29/2.03). Semantic similarity values were calculated for the critical 
words within the underinformative and informative sentences using Latent Semantic 
Analysis (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998; available on the 
Internet at http://lsa.colorado.edu). As expected, underinformative words yielded a higher 
LSA value than informative words (underinformative, informative; M =.33/.17, SD 
=.23/.18; t(138) = 4.58, p < .001). As noted in the Introduction, higher LSA values are 
generally associated with smaller N400 amplitudes compared to lower LSA values, 
because the LSA values reflect in part the amount of lexico-semantic priming a word 
receives from the preceding context. 
For the semantic fit manipulation, we constructed another 70 sentence pairs that 
were identical except for the critical word. Critical words were selected that were 
relatively congruous or incongruous to the sentence with regard to world knowledge (see 
Table 1 for examples). Critical words in the two conditions were matched for average 
length in letters (congruous, incongruous, M = 6.4/6.3, SD = 2.1/1.7) and log frequency 
(Francis & Kucera, 1982; congruous, incongruous, M = 1.46/1.50, SD = 1.74/1.88). 
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Semantic similarity values were calculated for the congruous, incongruouswords using 
Latent Semantic Analysis. Good semantic fit words yielded a higher LSA value than poor 
semantic fit words (congruous, incongruous, M =.22/.14, SD =.11/.08; t(138) = 5.31, p < 
.001). At least two words followed the critical words before the sentence ended. 
We also created 35 filler sentences that each had a similar sentence structure as 
the scalar sentences but that always started with the quantifier ‘many’, and involved a 
simple and true statement (e.g., “Many vegetarians eat bean curd, which is rich in 
protein.”). 
We created two counterbalanced lists so that each sentence appeared in only one 
condition per list, but in all conditions equally often across lists. Within each list, items 
were pseudorandomly mixed with the 70 sentences containing a semantic fit 
manipulation (35 containing a relatively good fitting critical word, 35 containing a 
relatively poor fitting critical word) and the 35 filler sentences to limit the succession of 
identical sentence types, while matching trial-types on average list position. 
 
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a self-administered questionnaire that is designed 
to measure the extent to which adults with normal intelligence possess traits associated 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Although this scale is not a diagnostic measure, 
its discriminative validity as a screening tool has been clinically tested (Woodbury-Smith, 
Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005). The test consists of 50 items, made up 
of 10 questions assessing five subscales: Social Skill (e.g., ‘‘I would rather go to a library 
than a party”), Communication (e.g., ‘‘I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a 
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conversation going”), Imagination (e.g., ‘‘When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to 
work out the characters’ intentions”), Attention To Detail (e.g., ‘‘I usually notice car 
number plates or similar strings of information”), and Attention-Switching (e.g., ‘‘I 
frequently get so absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things”). Half the 
questions are worded to elicit an ‘agree’ response and the other half a ‘disagree’ 
response, addressing demonstrated areas of cognitive characteristics in ASD (DSM-IV, 
1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Higher scores on the AQ indicate stronger presence of 
traits associated with ASD. A score of 32+ appears to be a useful cutoff for 
distinguishing individuals who have clinically significant levels of autistic traits (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001; the maximum score of the participants in our study was 30). Such a 
high score on the AQ however does not mean that an individual has autism, because a 
diagnosis is only merited, based on diagnostic measures such as the DSM-IV (1994), 
ADI-R (Lord, Rutter & Couteur, 1994) or ADOS-G (Lord et al., 2000), if the individual 
is suffering a clinical level of distress as a result of their autistic traits. In the current 
study, the AQ was administered in a quiet room subsequently to the ERP experiment, and 
took each participant about 10 minutes. 
 
Procedure 
Participants silently read sentences, presented word-by-word and centered on a computer 
monitor, while minimizing eye-movements and blinks. There was no task other than 
reading for comprehension. To parallel natural reading times (Legge, Ahn, Klitz & 
Luebker, 1997), all words were presented using a variable presentation procedure (Otten 
& Van Berkum, 2008; see also Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). Word duration in ms was 
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computed as ((number of letters × 27) + 187), with a 10 letter maximum. Also, to mimic 
natural reading times at clause boundaries (e.g., Hirotani, Frazier & Rayner, 2006; Legge 
et al., 1997; Rayner, Kambe & Duffy, 2000), critical words (which were followed by a 
comma) were presented for an additional 227 ms, and sentence-final words for an 
additional 500 ms. All inter-word-intervals were 121 ms. Following sentence-final words, 
a blank screen was presented for 500 ms, followed by a fixation mark at which subjects 
could blink and self-pace on to the next sentence by a right-hand button press. 
Participants were given six short breaks. Total time-on-task was approximately 40 
minutes. After the ERP experiment, each subject was allowed a short break to wash up 
and was then administered a brief exit-interview, followed by the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient questionnaire. 
 In the exit-interview, participants received a booklet that contained 6 pages and 
were instructed to answer the question from the booklet page-by-page without looking at 
the subsequent pages. On page 1, subjects were asked to report whether they noticed 
anything about the sentences they read and what research question(s) they thought the 
experiment was about. On page 2, an example of an informative scalar sentence was 
given, and participants reported whether they thought that sentences starting with ‘Some’ 
stood out, what they thought the purpose of these sentences was, and what research 
question these sentences involved. On page 3, subjects reported whether they thought that 
some of the sentences in the experiment sounded odd and provided a brief explanation 
why they thought this. On pages 4 and 5, subjects were presented with 10 different scalar 
statements, including informative and underinformative scalar sentences truncated after 
the CW as well as longer sentences that contained locally informative or 
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underinformative phrases. Subjects were asked to rate whether each sentence was true 
(1=false, 5=true) and how normal they would find it if somebody said this (1=odd, 
5=normal). On page 6, subjects were informed that a sentences like “Some people have 
lungs” could be rated as false (because the sentence implies that most people do not have 
lungs) or true (because there are at least some people in the world that do have lungs). 
The subjects were asked to report whether they thought during the experiment about 
whether these sentences were true or false, whether they during the experiment ‘treated’ 
these sentences as true or false, and how consistently they did this (1=very inconsistently, 
5=very consistently). 
 
EEG Recording 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 29 tin electrodes held in place on 
the scalp by an elastic cap (Electro-Cap International, Inc., Eaton, OH, USA). Electrode 
locations included Fz, Cz, Pz, Oz, Fp1/2, F3/4, F7/8, FC1/2, FC5/6, C3/4, T3/4, T5/6, 
CP1/2, CP5/6, P3/4, P7/8, O1/2, and 2 additional EOG electrodes; all were referenced to 
the left mastoid). The EEG recordings were amplified (band-pass filtered at 0.01 Hz–
40 Hz) and digitized at 200 Hz. Impedance was kept below 5 kOhm for EEG electrodes. 
Prior to off-line averaging, single-trial waveforms were automatically screened for 
amplifier blocking and muscle/blink/eye-movement artifacts over 850 ms epochs 
(starting 100 ms before CW onset). Two participants were excluded due to excessive 
artifacts (mean trial loss > 50%). For the remaining 29 participants, average ERPs 
(normalized by subtraction to a 100 ms pre-stimulus baseline) were computed over 
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artifact-free trials for CWs in all conditions (mean trial loss across conditions 11%, range 
0-42%, without substantial differences in mean trial loss across conditions). 
 
Statistical analysis 
For all analyses reported below, the Greenhouse/Geisser correction was applied to 
F tests with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator. Note that due to the large 
number of trials needed for averaging in ERPs (which reduces the probability that the 
results hinge on just a few odd items), statistics are only reported for by subjects 
analyses, and analyses by items are not included. 
 
RESULTS 
Main effect of informativeness 
Critical words elicited very similar N400 responses in the underinformative and 
the informative statements (see Figure 1, left panel). Because modulation of the N400 
ERP is generally maximal at posterior electrodes (e.g., Kutas et al., 2006), we divided all 
electrodes into anterior electrodes (F3/4, F7/8, F9/10, FC1/2, FC5/6, FP1/2, FPz, Fz) and 
posterior electrodes (Pz, Oz, CP1/2, CP5/6, P3/4, P7/8, O1/2) for subsequent analyses. 
Using mean amplitude in the 350 to 450 ms time window, a 2 (informativeness: 
informative, underinformative) × 2 (AP distribution: anterior, posterior) repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the ERP responses to informative and underinformative 
statements, and no interaction effect between informativeness and AP distribution. 
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AQ-Comm score and ERP responses to informativeness 
AQ scores ranged from 9 to 30 (M=21, SD=7.04). To explore the role of 
pragmatic abilities, we first grouped the participants into low AQ-Comm (N=15) and 
high AQ-Comm (N=14) groups based on the median split of scores on the 
Communication subscale. AQ-Comm score for the low AQ-Comm group ranged from 0 
to 5 (M=2.33, SD=.51; 7 males and 8 females, mean age 20.9 years, mean total AQ score 
15.8), and from 6 to 9 for the high AQ-Comm group (M=7.2, SD=.28; 8 males and 6 
females, mean age 19.3 years, mean total AQ score 26.5). The two AQ-Comm groups 
showed statistically significant differences in AQ-Comm score (t(27)=8.34, p<.001) and 
in total AQ score (t(27)=6.24, p<.001), as well as in age (t(27)=2.49, p<.05; when entered 
into the subsequent analyses as a covariate, the factor age, however, did not change the 
patterns of results. 
 Grand average ERPs for the two groups are displayed in Figure 1 (middle panel). 
Using mean amplitude in the 350 to 450 ms time window, the overall ANOVA revealed a 
significant 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) x 2 (AQ-Comm Group: 
low AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) interaction effect when using all electrodes 
(F(1,27)=9.45, p=.005). There was no significant 3-way interaction with AP distribution 
(F(1,27)=2.19, p=.15), but the Informativeness by AQ-Comm group interaction effect 
was statistically significant when using only posterior electrodes (F(1,27)=11.54, 
p=.002), but only marginally significant when using anterior electrodes (F(1,27)=3.3, 
p=.07). This predominantly posterior distribution of N400 modulation is consistent with 
the N400 literature (e.g., Kutas et al., 2006). 
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Simple main-effect analysis for the groups separately, using posterior electrodes 
only, showed that underinformative statements elicited larger N400 responses than 
informative statements in the low AQ-Comm group (F(1,14)=5.57, p=.033, CI -.82 ± 
.75), whereas informative statements elicited larger N400 responses than 
underinformative statements in the high AQ-Comm group (F(1,13)=6.12, p=.028, CI -
1.38 ± 1.2). There was no statistically significant effect of informativeness in the two 
AQ-Comm groups separately when taking into account anterior electrodes only (Fs<1, 
n.s.). 
As can be seen from Figure 1, there appeared to be differential effects of 
informativeness for the two groups before the 350-450 ms time window. We therefore 
performed additional 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) x 2 (AQ-Comm 
Group: low AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) ANOVAs for the 50-150, 150-250 and 250-
350 time windows. These revealed some significant effects within early time windows 
(50-150 ms in the low AQ-Comm group, 150-250 ms in the high AQ-Comm group; see 
Appendix A for full report, which can be found at 
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/kuperberglab/materials.htm). We were concerned that 
these early effects of informativeness reflected an artefactual side effect of dividing 
subjects on the basis of their AQ-Comm score. It is well-known that with limited 
numbers of EEG trials going into the average of a single subject, single-subject ERPs 
constitute unknown mixtures of critical ERP effects and residual EEG background noise 
which could, in principle, explain the early onset ERP differences. We therefore repeated 
analyses using a longer, 500 ms pre-CW baseline thus reducing noise in the baseline time 
window (and consequently, in the post-baseline ERP signal). ERP difference effects that 
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truly are the result of the experimental manipulation should survive this longer baseline 
analysis. The corresponding figures for these analyses can be found at the website as 
referenced above. After rebaselining, the early effects in the 50-150 and 150-250 ms 
windows disappeared but left the main pattern of results in the 250-350 and 350-450 ms 
windows unchanged (see Appendix A). Additional analyses for the post-450 ms time 
windows using the original baseline as well as the new baseline can also be found on our 
website. 
 
Correlation analysis for AQ-Comm scores and ERP responses to informativeness 
We also performed a correlation analysis that took into account the full range in 
individual AQ-Comm scores, and revealed a negative correlation between AQ-Comm 
score and the mean ERP difference score calculated as underinformative minus 
informative in the 350-450 ms time window at posterior electrodes (Pearson’s r = -.53, 
p=.003; see Figure 1, right panel). This correlation effect was also present for total AQ 
score (r = -.55, p=.002), the Social Skill subscale score (r = -.45, p=.014) and Attention-
Switching subscale score (r = -.55, p=.002), but was not significant for scores on the 
subscales Imagination (r = -.21, p=.29) and Attention To Detail (r =.17, p=.39).We 
should note that the Attention-Switching subscale and the Communication subscale were 
also the strongest interrelated subscales, so the effects of these subscales are hard to tease 
apart. 
 
ERP responses to informativeness and the role of LSA 
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 As mentioned in the Introduction, the content words in underinformative 
statements co-occur in language relatively more frequently than those in the informative 
statements, as reflected by their differences in LSA values. However, not each 
underinformative statement from each sentence pair had a larger LSA value than its 
informative counterpart. This allowed us to separate our items into one set that had a 
relatively small LSA difference between informative and underinformative sentences 
(LSA(underinformative-informative), M =-0.02, SD = 0.12), and one set that had a 
relatively large LSA difference across conditions (M =0.34, SD =0.18). By computing 
ERPs separately for these two sets for each group, we investigated the effect of 
informativeness while controlling for lexical-semantic factors. 
The corresponding figures for these analyses can be found at 
(http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/kuperberglab/materials.htm). These plots reveal clear 
differences between the low and high AQ-Comm groups in N400 modulation by LSA 
and informativeness. Analyses focusing on N400 peak amplitude modulations across 
posterior electrodes in the 350-450 ms time window showed that the informativeness by 
LSA difference interaction effect was significant in the high AQ-Comm group 
(F(1,13)=5.38, p=.037), but not in the low AQ-Comm group (F(1,14)=.02, p=.90). 
Follow-ups showed that, in the low AQ-Comm group, critical words in underinformative 
statements elicited a larger N400 than those in informative statements, both when there 
was a relatively small and a relatively large LSA difference between conditions (small 
difference, F(1,14)=2.37, p=.043, CI -.84 ± .76; large difference, F(1,14)=2.19, p=.052, 
CI -.80 ± .77). In the high AQ-Comm group, however, underinformative statements 
elicited a lower N400 than informative statements only when there was a relatively large 
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LSA difference (F(1,13) =4.01, p= 0.001, CI -2.25 ± 1.21), but not when there was a 
relatively small LSA difference (F(1,13) =.21, p= 0.834, CI -.17 ± 1.76).  
In sum, whereas we found a typical modulation of LSA in the high AQ-Comm 
group, the pragmatic N400 effect in the low AQ-Comm group was insensitive to LSA. 
 
Group differences in ERP responses to sentence-final words 
We also examined the ERP responses to sentence-final words in underinformative 
and informative statements between the two AQ-Comm groups (see Figure 2). Statistical 
analyses were carried out using mean amplitude in the 300 to 500 ms. The sentence-final 
words involved different word categories, and there may have been differences in 
naturalness of the second clauses following informative versus underinformative 
statement. Our main interest in this comparison was therefore not the main effects of 
informativeness (positive ERPs to sentence-final words of underinformative than 
informative sentences across both groups, F(1,27)=20.28, p<.001, CI .96 ± .46), but 
rather the differences between the two AQ-Comm groups to the same set of stimuli. As 
shown in Figure 2, there was a clear differential ERP effect on the sentence-final words 
in underinformative and informative statements in the low AQ-Comm group, but less so 
in the high AQ-Comm group. This differential ERP effect appeared to have a slightly 
frontal distribution (i.e., inconsistent with an N400 effect scalp distribution), and may 
reflect additional sentence wrap-up processing. Across all electrodes, the overall 
ANOVA revealed a marginally significant informativeness by AQ-Comm group 
interaction effect (F(1,27)=3.88, p=.059) and follow-ups showed that the modulation by 
informativeness was significant in the low AQ-Comm group (F(1,27)=17.56, p=.001, CI 
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1.36 ± .70), but only marginally significant in the high AQ-Comm group (F(1,27)=3.64, 
p=.079, CI .54 ± . 60). A 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) × 2 (AP 
distribution: anterior, posterior) ANOVA revealed no interaction effect of 
informativeness with anterior-posterior distribution (F<1), and there was no significant 
interaction between informativeness, AQ-Comm group and distribution (F<1). Because 
the effect was prolonged, we repeated the above analyses in the 500-700 ms window and 
this yielded the same pattern of results. 
 
Group differences in ERP responses to real-world congruous versus incongruous 
sentences 
To determine the specificity of the group differences in ERP responses to 
underinformativeness, we also examined whether the groups differed in their N400 
modulation to words that were congruous versus incongruous with real-world knowledge. 
We compared the modulation of the N400 by words with a relatively poor versus good fit 
based on real-world knowledge across the two groups. As can be seen from Figure 3, the 
modulation of the N400 was quite similar across the two groups. Using mean amplitude 
at posterior electrodes in the 350 to 450 ms time window, the overall 2 (Real world 
congruity: congruous, incongruous) x 2 (AQ-Comm Group: low AQ-Comm, high AQ-
Comm) ANOVA revealed that the incongruous words evoked a larger amplitude N400 
than congruous words (F(1,27)=19.28, p<.001, CI -1.35 ± .64) However, no Real world 
congruity by AQ-Comm Group interaction was observed (F(1,27)=1.77, p=.19).  There 
was also no significant Real world congruity by AQ-Comm Group interaction in the 
adjoining 250-350 and 450-550 time windows (all Fs < 2, ns.). Consistent with the 
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absence of this interaction, there was also no significant correlation between the N400 
difference effect in the 350-450 ms time window and AQ-Comm score (Pearson’s r = -
.29, p=.13).  
 
Exploratory analyses of ERP responses to the scalar quantifiers 
Although our experiment was not specifically designed to examine ERP responses 
to the scalar quantifiers, we performed an exploratory analysis to investigate whether 
there were differences between the two AQ-Comm groups in ERP responses to the 
sentence-initial scalar quantifiers ´Some´ (the sentence-initial word of the experimental 
sentences) and ´Many´ (the sentence-initial word in 35 filler sentences).  The reasoning 
behind this analysis was that if the quantifiers themselves evoke differential pragmatic 
processing, then the differences in pragmatic abilities between the groups may already 
become apparent at the quantifier. We note that the quantifier ‘many’ can elicit a “not all” 
implicature as can ‘some’, so this comparison is not optimal for examining differences in 
pragmatic processing. However, because these quantifiers can be arranged on a scale of 
informativeness where ‘many’ is stronger than ‘some’, the ‘some’ implicature would 
include “not many” as well as “not all”. In this sense, and particularly in an experimental 
context in which both are repeatedly presented, one could argue that these scalar 
quantifiers are associated with implicatures that are of different strength. 
The figures corresponding to this analysis can be accessed at 
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/kuperberglab/materials.htm. In the high AQ-Comm 
group, ´Many´, relative to ‘Some’ appeared to evoke a slightly more negative right-
lateralized waveform at about 300-350 ms and a more positive frontally-distributed 
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waveform at about 650-700 ms. There appeared to be no such effect in the low AQ 
group. We performed a series of repeated measures ANOVAs to test for the 2 (quantifier: 
some, many) by 2 (AQ-Comm group: low AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) interaction, in 
adjoining 50 ms time windows between 100 and 800 ms after quantifier onset, using all 
electrodes or only anterior or posterior electrodes. The only (marginally) significant 
interaction effect was found in the 650-700 ms window using anterior electrodes 
(F(1,27)=3.77, p=.063). Follow-up analyses confirmed that ´many´ elicited more positive 
ERPs than ´some´ in the high AQ-Comm group (F(1,13)=14.70, p=.002, CI -2.04 ± 
1.15), but there was no difference between the two quantifiers in the low AQ-Comm 
group (F(1,14)=.07, p=.80, CI -.21 ± 1.68). In addition, this frontal positivity effect 
showed a marginally significant correlation with AQ-Comm score (Pearson’s r = .34, 
p=.073). There was also a marginally significant correlation between the frontal positivity 
effect and  the differential ERP effect at the critical words, suggesting that participants 
who showed a larger frontal positive effect were less likely to show a pragmatic N400 
effect later in the sentence (r = -.35, p=.06). The frontal positivity, however, did not 
predict the N400 modulation by real-world congruity (Pearson’s r = -.15, p=.46). 
 
Exit interview 
We examined whether the AQ-Comm groups differed in their exit-interview 
ratings for truth-value and naturalness. A 2 (AQ-Comm group: low AQ-Comm, high AQ-
Comm) by 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) ANOVA revealed no 
group differences in the truth-value ratings and the naturalness ratings (all Fs<2). In 
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addition, underinformative and informative statements received similar truth-value 
ratings (t<1) but different naturalness ratings (t(1,28)= 15.98, p < .001). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Across all participants, underinformative statements elicited N400 responses that 
were similar to those elicited by informative statements. However, there was marked 
heterogeneity across individuals in N400 modulation, with some individuals showing a 
larger N400 to critical words in underinformative than in informative statements, and 
others showing the opposite pattern of modulation (i.e., a larger N400 to critical words in 
informative than underinformative statements). Most importantly, these individual 
differences could be explained by taking into account individual variability in real-world 
pragmatic language ability. Individuals with few pragmatic language difficulties (as 
indexed by a low score on the AQ Communication subscale) were more sensitive to the 
pragmatic ‘violation’ of underinformativeness. This opposite pattern of activity was clear 
both in a median split analysis that dichotomized the two groups and in a correlation 
analysis that took into account the full range in individual AQ-Comm scores. 
Importantly, this N400 modulation by AQ-Comm score did not extend to the N400 
responses to words with a relatively poor fit with respect to world knowledge, suggesting 
that AQ-Comm score was fairly specific in explaining the pattern of N400 modulation to 
the pragmatic violations. In addition, the two groups were differentially sensitive to 
lexical-semantic co-occurrence: whereas the low AQ-Comm group showed a pragmatic 
N400 effect independently of whether the underinformative and informative sentences 
were matched for LSA, the high AQ-Comm group´s ERP responses were modulated by 
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LSA. Finally, we also explored ERP responses to the scalar quantifier ´some´ versus´ 
many´. Although these quantifiers could be argued to evoke related (although not 
identical) pragmatic processes, rendering this comparison suboptimal for examining 
potential differences in pragmatic processing, we did find some preliminary evidence that 
pragmatic abilities influenced processing at the scalars themselves. 
If one considers only the pragmatically skilled participants, our results show that 
pragmatically underinformative statements are associated with early semantic processing 
costs (see also Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008). This result suggests that the pragmatic 
meaning of a scalar quantifier can, in principle, be rapidly and incrementally incorporated 
during sentence comprehension, a finding that is consistent with models of language 
processing that incorporate an incremental contribution of pragmatic factors (Crain & 
Steedman, 1985; Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995) and with 
the results of studies from the visual world paradigm (Grodner et al., 2010).  
In contrast to the more pragmatically skilled participants, however, the less 
pragmatically skilled participants showed no pragmatic N400 effect. Their processing 
was rather driven primarily by the relatively closer lexical-semantic relationships 
between individual words in these statements which overrode pragmatic factors. One 
possible interpretation of these results is that these individuals, who report difficulties 
with pragmatic abilities in everyday life, were simply incapable of generating scalar 
inferences. One could argue that this conclusion is in line with the notion from Relevance 
Theory that scalar inferences are not obligatory (see also Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck 
& Posada, 2003) but depend on constraints from the context and possibly from 
neuropsychological factors (see also Happé, 1993). 
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 However, if one takes into account the ERP patterns elicited by sentence-initial 
scalars, a more complicated picture emerges. The exploratory analyses of ERP responses 
elicited by the sentence-initial scalar quantifiers suggest that pragmatic abilities 
influenced scalar statement processing already at the scalar quantifier. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, differential processing of the two different scalar quantifiers was most 
pronounced in the pragmatically less skilled participants. We will provide more in-depth 
discussion of these issues in the general discussion, but what these results suggest is that 
pragmatically less skilled participants may have been able to temporarily ignore or inhibit 
their pragmatic knowledge during the processing of the critical words (see Feeney et al., 
2004; Handley & Feeney, in press), instead of being insensitive to pragmatic constraints 
(e.g., Schindele et al., 2008). 
In sum, our results suggest that pragmatic constraints can have rapid effects 
during on-line sentence comprehension. When pragmatic constraints are taken into 
account, as in low AQ-Comm people, they may guide expectations about upcoming 
words through the pragmatic presumption of informativeness. But when these constraints 
cannot be used or they are ignored, as in the high AQ-Comm group, the effects of other 
constraints may surface, such as the effect of lexical-semantic relationships. In our 
second experiment, we examined the incremental processing of weak scalar quantifiers 
further by modulating the effect of pragmatic constraints through linguistic focus. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
INTRODUCTION 
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Whereas blatantly underinformative statements that violate pragmatic principles 
are relatively uncommon in everyday language (perhaps with the notable exception of 
utterances where underinformativeness is used as a humoristic device), temporarily 
underinformative statements are quite common. For example, whereas a phrase such as 
“Some people have eyes,” is unlikely to appear, a sentence such as “Some people have 
eyes that are different colors” is much more natural.  
In the sentence “Some people have eyes,” the comma signals clausal wrap-up and 
the end of the quantifier scope. This puts the clause-final words ‘eyes’ clearly into focus 
(e.g., Birch & Rayner, 1997; Hirotani, Frazier & Rayner, 2006). In contrast, in “Some 
people have eyes that are different colors”, the scope of the quantifier encompasses the 
whole relative clause construction (‘eyes that are different colors’) and the focus of the 
utterance – the part of the statement that the communicator wants to emphasize and is 
most relevant to the addressee for evaluating sentence meaning – is not ‘eyes’ but 
‘different colors’. 
Research on the role of focus in language comprehension suggests that the 
processing of unfocused materials is dominated by ‘low-level’ lexical-semantic 
relationships rather than by ‘full-fledged’ compositional processing that is needed to 
establish sentence truth-value or real-world plausibility (e.g., Ferreira, Bailey & Ferraro, 
2002; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). This is because readers and listeners generally devote less 
attention and processing time to unfocused material than to focused material (e.g., Cutler, 
Dahan & Van Donselaar, 1997; Frazier, Carlson & Clifton, 2006), so that unfocused 
materials receive an incomplete semantic and pragmatic analysis (so-called shallow 
processing; e.g., Sanford & Garrod, 1998). 
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 In Experiment 2, a second set of participants read sentences like “Some people 
have eyes that are different colors”. The first clauses of these sentences were identical to 
those used in Experiment 1, but the comma was excluded and the clause was always 
followed by a relative clause (see Table 2, for examples). Thus the sentences were 
informative overall but the first clause could be considered ‘locally’ underinformative. 
Given the absence of the comma and the fact that all scalar sentences in Experiment 2 
had this same structure, we expected the critical words to be out of focus and we 
hypothesized that they would therefore be processed more shallowly (e.g., Sanford & 
Sturt, 2002), and the ERP response would be dominated by simple lexical-semantic 
relationships rather than by the pragmatic presumption of informativeness. In other 
words, we predicted that locally underinformative statements would fail to evoke a 
pragmatic N400 effect. Rather, we predicted that the N400 would be reduced, relative to 
the informative statements, because of their closer lexical-semantic relationships. In 
addition, we predicted that this effect would not be modulated by the real-world 
pragmatic abilities (AQ-Comm score) of the participants because the relevant pragmatic 
constraints were now the same in the informative and underinformative statements. 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-one right-handed Tufts students (13 males; mean age = 19.7 years) gave written 
informed consent. All were native English speakers, without neurological or psychiatric 
disorders, and had not participated in Experiment 1. 
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Materials 
We constructed 70 sentence pairs that were identical to the 70 critical sentence pairs from 
Experiment 1 up until and including the critical words (see Table 2). The 70 new 
sentences did not contain commas, and the critical words were always followed by a 
relative clause (e.g., “Some people have lungs that are diseased by viruses.”). In addition, 
we created 35 new filler sentences that, as in Experiment 1, started with the quantifier 
‘many’ and involved a simple and true statement, and that, like the new ‘some’ sentences, 
did not contain a comma (e.g., “Many people catch the flu in the winter.”). To examine 
ERP responses to semantic fit, participants in Experiment 2 were also presented the exact 
same 70 sentences containing the semantic fit manipulation as used in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure & EEG Recording 
The procedure of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 except for the 
presentation duration of the critical words (which was 227 ms longer in Experiment 1 due 
to the presence of commas). 
 EEG recording and pre-processing in Experiment 2 was identical to that in 
Experiment 1. Two participants were excluded due to excessive artifacts (mean trial loss 
> 50%). For the remaining 29 participants, average ERPs (normalized by subtraction to a 
100 ms pre-stimulus baseline) were computed over artifact-free trials for CWs in all 
conditions (mean trial loss across conditions 12%, range 0-35%, without substantial 
differences in mean trial loss across conditions). 
 The exit interview in Experiment 2 was identical to that from Experiment 1 
except for the last page. In Experiment 2, the last page gave subjects an example of a 
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locally underinformative sentence and a locally informative sentence, and an explanation 
for why the first part of the sentence could be considered informative or 
underinformative. Subjects subsequently reported whether they had noticed during the 
ERP experiment that the first part of some sentences was odd for the above mentioned 
reason? If they answered ‘yes’ they were asked to report how consistently (on a 5-point 
scale) they noticed that some of these sentences sounded odd, whether they treated such 
underinformative sentences as true or false, and how consistently (on a 5-point scale) 
they treated these sentences as true or false. 
 
RESULTS 
Main effect of informativeness 
Critical words elicited larger N400 responses in the informative statements 
compared to the underinformative statements (see Figure 4, left panel). Using mean 
amplitude across all electrodes in the 350 to 450 ms time window, a 2 (informativeness: 
informative, underinformative) × 2 (distribution: anterior, posterior) ANOVA revealed 
that informative statements elicited a larger N400 ERP than underinformative statements 
(F(1,28) = 7.52, p= 0.011, CI -.56 ± .42), whereas this effect did not differ across anterior 
and posterior electrodes (F(1,28) =.162, p= 0.690).  Separate ANOVAs for anterior and 
posterior electrodes, however, revealed that the main effect of condition was only 
marginally significant at anterior electrodes (F(1,28) = 3.69, p= 0.065, CI -.53 ± .56) but 
fully statistically significant at posterior electrodes (F(1,28) = 6.87, p= 0.014, CI -.65 ± 
.51). 
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AQ-Comm score and ERP responses to informativeness 
AQ scores ranged from 5 to 36 (M=21.17, SD=7.88). The participants were again 
grouped into low AQ-Comm (N=14) and high AQ-Comm (N=15) groups based on the 
median split of scores on the Communication subscale. AQ-Comm score for the low AQ-
Comm group ranged from 0 to 5 (M=1.43, SD=.43; 5 males and 9 females, mean age 
20.4 years, mean total AQ score 15.9), and from 6 to 9 for the high AQ-Comm group 
(M=7.4, SD=.25; 7 males and 8 females, mean age 19.2 years, mean total AQ score 
26.1). The two AQ-Comm groups showed statistically significant differences in AQ-
Comm score (t(27)=12.18, p<.001) and in total AQ score (t(27)=4.49, p<.001), as well as 
in age (t(27)=2.43, p<.05). As in Experiment 1, the factor age, when entered into the 
subsequent analyses as a covariate, did not change the patterns of results. 
Grand average ERPs for the two groups are displayed in Figure 4 (right panel). 
Using mean amplitude at posterior electrodes in the 350 to 450 ms time window, the 
overall 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) x 2 (AQ-Comm Group: low 
AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) ANOVA revealed no significant interaction effect 
(F(1,27)=.712, p=.41), suggesting that the groups similarly showed larger N400 
responses to informative compared to underinformative statements. Consistent with this 
result, and in contrast to Experiment 1, pragmatic abilities now did not predict the size of 
the underinformativeness N400 effect, as there was no significant correlation between 
AQ-Comm score and the mean ERP difference score for underinformative and 
informative statements (Pearson’s r = .034, p=.86), nor between the ERP difference score 
and scores on the total AQ score (r = -.11, p=.57) or any of the AQ subscales (Social 
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Skill, r = -.09, p=.63; Attention-Switching, r = -.13, p=.516; Imagination, r = 0.78, p=.69; 
Attention To Detail, r = -.282, p=.139). 
To directly test for differential effects of AQ-Comm group across the two 
experiments, we performed a 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) x 2 (AQ 
Group: low AQ, high AQ)  x 2 (Experiment: Experiment 1, Experiment 2) ANOVA. This 
analysis revealed a statistically significant 3-way interaction effect (F(1,54)=8.29, 
p=.006), supporting the observation that AQ-Comm modulated the effect of 
informativeness in Experiment 1 but not in Experiment 2. 
 
ERP responses to informativeness and the role of LSA 
 We repeated the same analyses as in Experiment 1 to investigate the role of 
lexical-semantic factors, and computed ERP responses for one item set that had a 
relatively small LSA difference between informative and underinformative sentences, 
and one set that had a relatively large LSA difference between conditions (see 
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/kuperberglab/materials.htm). The results indicated that 
across both groups, LSA modulated the effect of informativeness (F(1,28)=5.31, p=.029) 
such there was an effect of informativeness in  the item set with large LSA differences 
between conditions (F(1,28)=9.35, p=.005) but not in the item set with small LSA 
differences between conditions (F(1,28)=.31, p=.58). These results did not differ between 
the two groups (F(1,27)=.88, p=.36). 
 
Group differences in ERP responses to sentence-final words 
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We also examined the ERP responses to sentence-final words in underinformative 
and informative statements between the two AQ-Comm groups. As shown in Figure 5, 
there was no modulation of ERPs evoked by sentence-final words in the 
underinformative relative to the informative statements in either the low or the high AQ-
Comm group. Using mean amplitude in the 300 to 500 ms time window across all 
electrodes, the overall ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of informativeness 
(F(1,28)=.13, p=.72) and no significant interaction effect of informativeness with AQ-
Comm group (F(1,27)=.92, p=.35). Repeating the above analyses for sentence-final 
words across the 500-700 ms window yielded the same pattern of results. 
 
Group differences in ERP responses to real-world congruity 
As in Experiment 1, the two AQ-Comm groups produced similar real world 
congruity N400 effects (see Figure 6). Using mean amplitude at posterior electrodes in 
the 350 to 450 ms time window, the overall 2 (Real world congruity: congruous, 
incongruous) x 2 (AQ-Comm Group: low AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) ANOVA 
revealed a significant main N400 effect of real world congruity (F(1,28)=23.05, p<.001, 
CI -1.66 ± .73) but no significant congruity by group interaction effect (F(1,27)=2.26, 
p=.15). Also, as in Experiment 1, there was no significant correlation between AQ-Comm 
score and the size of the real world congruity N400 effect (r = .15, p=.44).  
In a direct test for differential effects of AQ-Comm group across the two 
experiments, a 2 (Real world congruity: congruous, incongruous) x 2 (AQ Group: low 
AQ, high AQ) x 2 (Experiment: Experiment 1, Experiment 2) ANOVA did not reveal a 
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significant 3-way interaction effect (F(1,54)=1.41, p=.24), i.e. the two AQ-Comm 
subgroups showed the same effects of real world congruity in the two experiments.  
 
Exploratory analyses for ERP responses to the scalar quantifiers 
As in Experiment 1, we examined whether the two groups differed in their ERP 
responses to the sentence-initial quantifiers (the results are available at 
http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/kuperberglab/materials.htm). The quantifier ´Some´ 
elicited a relatively broadly distributed negativity compared to ´Many´ in both groups. 
We performed a series of repeated measures ANOVAs to test for a 2 (quantifier: some, 
many) by 2 (AQ-Comm group: low AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) interaction, in 
adjoining 50 ms time windows between 100 and 800 ms after quantifier onset, using all 
electrodes or only anterior or posterior electrodes. Only in the 450-500 ms window was 
there a marginally significant interaction effect when using all electrodes (F(1,27)=4.2, 
p=.053), or only anterior electrodes (F(1,27)=2.99, p=.095). Follow-ups showed that the 
quantifier ´some´ elicited a more negative ERP compared to ´many´ in the low AQ-
Comm group (all electrodes, F(1,13)=4.314, p=.058, CI -.85 ± .87; anterior electrodes, 
F(1,13)=5.353, p=.038, CI -1.07 ± 1.00), but not in the high AQ-Comm group (all 
electrodes, F(1,14)=.564, p=.465, CI .29 ± .27; anterior electrodes, F(1,14)=.017, p=.90, 
CI -.05 ± -.81). Additional analyses showed that there was a marginally significant 
correlation between AQ-Comm and the differential quantifier effect when using all 
electrodes (r = -.366, p=.051). The differential ERP effect at the quantifier further 
predicted the differential ERP effect at the critical word when using posterior electrodes 
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(r = -.435, p=.018), but also the differential ERP effect of real world congruity (r = -.51, 
p=.005).  
 
Exit interview 
We examined whether the AQ-Comm groups differed in their exit-interview 
ratings for truth-value and naturalness. As in Experiment 1, the 2 (AQ-Comm group: low 
AQ-Comm, high AQ-Comm) by 2 (informativeness: informative, underinformative) 
ANOVA revealed no group differences in the truth-value ratings and the naturalness 
ratings (all Fs<2). In addition, underinformative and informative statements received 
similar truth-value ratings (t<1) but different naturalness ratings (t(1,28)= 9.3, p < .001) 
 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 2, critical words in statements that were temporarily underinformative but 
out of discourse focus elicited a smaller N400 than critical words in informative 
statements. This effect was not modulated by the pragmatic language abilities of the 
participants, but was modulated by the lexical-semantic differences between conditions. 
We take these results to suggest that, when statements were out of focus (in this case due 
to the sentence structure and scalar quantifier scope), initial semantic processing costs 
were driven primarily by the lexical-semantic relationships between each critical word 
and the previous words in the sentence, rather than pragmatic constraints of 
informativeness. Interestingly, whereas all participants in Experiment 1 had indicated in 
the exit-interview to have noticed underinformativeness, none of the participants in 
 46 
Experiment 2 indicated to have noticed any ‘local’ underinformativeness and there were 
no differential processing costs on sentence-final words. 
 As mentioned in the introduction to Experiment 2, we think that the fact that all 
scalar sentences in Experiment 2 had the same relative clause construction may have 
contributed to the relatively shallow processing of critical words, as compared to 
Experiment 1. We designed the experiment in this way so that participants would expect 
all scalar sentences to have a particular structure with the most important information 
near the end of the sentence, directing their focus away from the critical words. These 
experiment-based expectations may be related to structural priming in comprehension 
whereby the syntactic structure of a sentence can influence the analysis of subsequent 
sentences (e.g., Branigan, 2007, for review). 
 As in Experiment 1, we found an interaction effect between pragmatic abilities 
and the ERP response to the sentence-initial quantifiers in Experiment 2, suggesting that 
the groups differed in their pragmatic response to the quantifiers. However, this was not a 
clear-cut replication. Whereas the high AQ-Com group showed a larger differential effect 
of quantifier type in Experiment 1, it was the low AQ-Comm group that showed a larger 
differential effect of quantifier type in Experiment 2. In addition, although the differential 
effects of quantifier type were most pronounced at anterior electrodes in both 
experiments, the statistically significant interaction effects occurred in different time 
windows across the two experiments. Of course, the experiments differed in an important 
way, namely that in Experiment 1 the quantifier ´some´ was associated with potential 
underinformativeness downstream, but not in Experiment 2. It is therefore possible that 
the different patterns of results across the experiments reflect that certain task-strategies 
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that were relevant in Experiment 1 (e.g., pragmatic processing related to the differences 
in informativeness between ‘Some’ and ‘Many’) were not applicable in Experiment 2. 
Taken together, the results from our first and second experiment suggest that 
contextual factors, whether these are derived from individual pragmatic abilities or the 
overall experimental context (see also Breheny et al., 2006), and lexical-semantic factors 
modulate the processing of scalar statements. Moreover, when contextual factors 
attenuate the impact of pragmatic underinformativeness, either because certain 
participants are less likely to process ´pragmatically´ or because the experimental context 
makes local underinformativeness go unnoticed, lexical-semantic factors are more likely 
to surface. 
  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1, we tested the hypothesis that pragmatically underinformative statements 
incur a semantic processing cost as indexed by the N400 ERP component, and, moreover, 
that this is more likely to happen in healthy individuals who are relatively pragmatically 
skilled than in healthy individuals who report everyday-life pragmatic communication 
difficulties. Across all participants, underinformative and informative statements (e.g., 
“Some people have lungs/pets, …”) elicited similar N400 ERPs, but this absence of an 
overall effect was due to opposite effects in participants depending on their pragmatic 
abilities. Pragmatically more skilled participants (the low AQ group) showed a larger 
N400 to underinformative versus informative statements – a pragmatic N400 effect that 
was independent of the lexical-semantic differences between the underinformative and 
informative conditions. In contrast, pragmatically less skilled participants (the high AQ 
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group) showed a larger N400 for informative versus underinformative statements, and 
this effect was driven by lexical-semantic factors because it disappeared when we 
controlled for lexical-semantic differences between conditions. Interestingly, in 
Experiment 1, processing differences between these two groups were already observable 
at the scalar quantifiers (differential effects on ‘some’ versus ‘many’ in the high AQ but 
not the low AQ group), and were also evident at the end of the sentences (a reduced 
effect on the sentence-final word in the high AQ relative to the low AQ group). In 
contrast, the two groups showed no differences in their N400 response to statements with 
a relatively poor versus good semantic fit in relation to real-world knowledge (e.g., 
“Wine and spirits contain sugar/alcohol ...”). 
 In Experiment 2, we examined the role of linguistic focus in pragmatic processing 
by comparing ERP responses to the same underinformative statements followed by a 
relative clause construction (e.g., “Some people have lungs/pets that…’). Because of the 
larger quantifier scope in these sentences, the local underinformativeness of the 
embedded statement was irrelevant to ongoing processing and, according to our exit-
interview, went unnoticed by all participants. As expected, the informative statements 
now elicited larger N400 ERPs than (locally) underinformative statements, and this N400 
modulation was strongly dependent on lexical-semantic factors in pragmatically more 
and less skilled participants alike. 
 
Implications for Theory 
The fact that underinformative statements elicited an N400 effect compared to 
informative statements, albeit only in a subgroup of participants, suggests that the 
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pragmatic meaning of scalar quantifiers (‘some but not all’) can rapidly and 
incrementally contribute to sentence comprehension (see also Grodner et al., 2010), at 
least to the extent that the pragmatic meaning was available when the critical was 
encountered. This pragmatic N400 effect is inconsistent with an early claim in the 
experimental pragmatic literature that pragmatic scalar meaning results from a post-
semantic decision process (e.g., Noveck & Posada, 2003), and with theoretical accounts 
of language processing that assume an initial, purely linguistic-semantic analysis that is 
followed by a later pragmatic stage of processing (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Forster, 1979). 
The implications of our results for Relevance Theory or for the Levinsonian 
account, however, are less clear as neither theory makes explicit predictions about the 
time course of inferential processes. In a Levinsonian account, the pragmatic scalar 
meaning is thought to be automatically generated without having to traverse through a 
logical interpretation first (e.g., Levinson, 2000), whereas Relevance Theory assumes that 
scalar inferences are made only when they are sufficiently supported by the discourse 
context (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1986). It has been argued by some researchers that 
because single sentences like “Some people have lungs” are without a discourse context 
(i.e., ‘neutral’), and because the logical interpretation is the default because of its 
simplicity. Thus, one interpretation of Relevance Theory might predict an initial logical 
interpretation and a delay in pragmatic interpretation (e.g., Breheny et al., 2006). The fact 
that we observed a pragmatic N400 effect on ‘lungs’ in the low AQ Group in Experiment 
1 suggests that there was no such initial logical interpretation at the point of the critical 
word. It suggests that, at least in these participants, the pragmatic meaning of ‘some’ was 
 50 
immediately available at the point of the critical word in the absence of a discourse 
context.  
On the other hand, there were several aspects of the data that are consistent with 
an interpretation of Relevance Theory that emphasizes the roles context, standard of 
relevance and that allows for certain anticipatory processes. First, the experiments 
themselves may be considered as ‘global context’ which, in principle, could have biased 
some participants towards making scalar inferences more frequently and rapidly than 
usual in Experiment 1 and discouraged these participants to generate such inferences in 
Experiment 2. Second, advocates of Relevance Theory have argued that the presumption 
of relevance may guide certain anticipatory processes (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2004), 
and that pragmatic scalar meaning can be generated without having to traverse through a 
logical interpretation first (see also Noveck & Sperber, 2007). Third, what is relevant or 
not will depend on the specific reader or listener and can therefore differ across 
individuals and groups. Each of these points is discussed in further detail below.  
 
Effects of Experimental context 
In both Experiment 1 and 2, many scalar sentences were presented in close 
succession. In Experiment 1, one might argue that the presentation of so many 
underinformative sentences biased the low-AQ participants towards generating more 
scalar inferences than they would during normal language comprehension. This, 
however, seems unlikely:  there is little support from the experimental literature that 
participants in experimental settings are biased towards generating scalar inferences. In 
fact, in studies using sentence-verification tasks, at least 40-50% of participants do not 
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generate scalar inferences (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003), perhaps 
because the true/false verification encourages a strategic use of formal logic (cf. Feeney 
et al. 2004). Also, our exit-interview in Experiment 1 indicated that all participants 
mentioned that they had treated the underinformative scalar statements as being true. 
This, if anything, suggests that the experimental context may have biased against the 
generation of scalar inferences. 
 In Experiment 2, however, the experimental context biased against the generation 
of scalar inferences limited to the critical word only, but not against the generation of 
scalar inferences per se. The experimental context in this experiment consisted of the 
repeated presentation of scalar statements with a quantifier scope that extended beyond 
the critical word, and therefore establishing truth-value of the complete proposition was 
only possible at a later moment in time. The result of this attenuation of the impact of 
local pragmatic underinformativeness by contextual factors was that the local 
underinformativeness went unnoticed, and that lexical-semantic factors dominated 
semantic processing of the critical words. 
 
Incremental processing and Pragmatic expectancy 
The observed relationship between pragmatic abilities and the N400 ERP was 
specific to pragmatic underinformativeness, because we found no relationship between 
pragmatic abilities and the N400 modulation by real-world semantic fit or modulation of 
the N400 in Experiment 2. These results suggest that the reported N400 modulation of 
informativeness is due of the ‘genuinely pragmatic’ violation of Gricean maxims (Grice, 
1975) instead of a violation of or deviation from real-world semantic knowledge. Thus, in 
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addition to other factors, the N400 indexes the lexico-semantic processing consequences 
of using pragmatic constraints during on-line sentence comprehension.  
In line with recent work, we have suggested that the pragmatic presumption of 
informativeness guides the participant’s expectations about upcoming words (e.g., Van 
Berkum, 2009; Van Berkum et al., 2005; Nieuwland and Kuperberg 2008), which 
facilitates subsequent semantic processing. Such expectations may be generated before 
the onset of the critical word, i.e. they may constitute active predictions that facilitate 
lexical access of the critical word (see DeLong et al., 2005; Van Berkum et al., 2005), or 
the relevant information may be retrieved only once the critical word is presented (e.g., 
Brown, Hagoort & Kutas, 2000; for discussion on these two different interpretations of 
the N400, see Federmeier & Kutas, 1999; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Kutas et al., 2006; 
Lau et al., 2008; Van Berkum, 2009). Although much of the prediction literature deals 
with lexically specific predictions during language comprehension (e.g., DeLong, Urbach 
& Kutas, 2005; Van Berkum et al., 2005), we take our results as potential evidence for 
relatively coarse-grained anticipation, a background of expectations of relevance that can 
be revised or elaborated as sentences unfold (e.g., Wilson & Sperber, 2002). 
We propose that, in the low AQ participants, the availability of pragmatic scalar 
meaning allowed participants to derive expectations about upcoming words based on the 
pragmatic presumption of informativeness, so that they expected the upcoming word to 
denote something that only some, hence not all people have. In this respect, we take our 
N400 results in these subjects in Experiment 1 not to directly reflect full-fledged, online 
pragmatic inferencing, but rather to reflect the semantic processing consequences of 
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earlier and relatively implicit pragmatic inferencing (see also Kuperberg et al. in press; 
Van Berkum, 2009).  
In addition to the effects at the critical word, there were also additional 
downstream processing consequences of violating pragmatic expectations, with effects on 
the sentence-final words in both low AQ and high AQ groups (although, as discussed 
below, this effect was somewhat smaller in the high AQ-Comm group). No such effect 
was seen in Experiment 2.  Our design did not allow us to test specific hypotheses with 
regard to these sentence-final effects and the nature of this differential ERP effect 
remains unclear. We think it is unlikely to be an N400 effect, because of its more frontal 
distribution and prolonged morphology. Instead, it could reflect a larger positivity to 
sentence-final words in the underinformative statements. This would be consistent with 
other reports of positive ERP effects elicited by sentence-final words in sentences 
requiring inferencing as compared simpler sentences (e.g., Filik, Sanford & Leuthold, 
2008; Kuperberg et al., in press), possibly reflecting additional sentence wrap-up 
processing (e.g., Steinhauer & Friederici, 2001). 
 
Individual differences in scalar processing 
One of the most striking findings of Experiment 1 was the heterogeneity between 
the individuals in their ERP profiles that was predicted by their real-life pragmatic 
abilities. One possible interpretation of these results is that scalar inferences are not 
obligatory (see also Bott & Noveck 2004; Breheny et al. 2006): many of the participants 
in Experiment 1 – the less pragmatically skilled participants– did not show a pragmatic 
N400 effect. This result seems to mirror the observation from the behavioral literature 
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that some people tend to make scalar inferences and some do not (e.g., Noveck & Posada, 
2003), as defined by a ‘false’ or a ‘true’ response to underinformative scalar statements.  
 The underlying cause of these individual differences is as yet unknown and 
such variability in the healthy adult population has often been ignored by researchers (but 
see Banga, Berends, Heutinck & Hendriks, in press; Feeney et al., 2004). One relatively 
trivial explanation for these individual differences is that the groups differed in the extent 
that they were actually paying attention to sentence meaning rather than to the superficial 
coherence or lexical-semantic relatedness of the words in the sentences. This seems 
unlikely, however, for several reasons. First, such a ´non-specific attention´ account 
would predict similar patterns for Experiment 1 and 2. In Experiment 2, however, we saw 
no between-group differences even though the same lexical items were presented. 
Second, such an account would predict group differences in the ERP responses to the 
real-world congruity manipulation. Even though the real-world congruous-incongruous 
sentences differed in several respects from the scalar sentences, one might expect some 
differential N400 effects between the two groups for these items, given that the N400 is 
sensitive to attentional factors (see Chwilla, Brown & Hagoort, 1994). Third, as discussed 
below, the high AQ participants showed differential effects at the point of the quantifier 
itself in Experiment 1, suggesting that they were attending to its meaning.  
We therefore suggest that a more specific impairment mediated the absence of a 
pragmatic N400 effect in the high AQ-Comm participants of Experiment 1. One 
possibility is that these participants were unable to generate scalar inferences, e.g., 
Noveck, 2001). This draws analogies from research on the differential ability of children 
and adults to generate scalar inferences. Young children (age 7-9 years) seem less likely 
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than older children or adults to generate scalar inferences (e.g., Noveck 2001; 
Pouscoupoulous, Noveck, Politzer & Bastide, 2007; Guasti et al., 2005; Smith, 1980), 
although it appears that this ability is largely constrained by task-specific features and 
that it can be improved by training (e.g., Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; 
Pouscoupoulous et al., 2007). Such results are often ascribed to children having a 
relatively under-developed ability for pragmatic inferencing or a relative insensitivity to 
pragmatic constraints (e.g., Smith, 1980). If the high AQ participants in the current study 
show similar impairments, these may, in turn, be related to the notion of ‘standard of 
relevance’ from Relevance Theory. This holds that individuals generate scalar inferences 
only when they are required to meet the individual’s internal standard of relevance, 
reflecting a trade-off between the possible cognitive gains associated with generating the 
inference and the amount of cognitive effort necessary to derive it (e.g., Carston, 1998). 
Individuals with self-reported impaired pragmatic abilities may have a lower standard of 
relevance, to the extent that they are less likely to compute the pragmatic consequences 
of linguistic input. It could also be the case that generating scalar inferences is more 
costly for those individuals, as has been suggested for children (e.g., Noveck, 2001). 
However, our ERP findings indicate that the high AQ-Comm group was not 
completely insensitive to the pragmatic manipulation. Both AQ-Comm groups showed a 
sentence-final ERP modulation by informativeness (although this effect was marginally 
larger in low AQ-Comm participants). In addition, both low and high AQ-Comm 
participants indicated in the exit interview that they had in fact registered the pragmatic 
anomaly. There are at least two different explanations for these results. First, it is possible 
that the high AQ-Comm participants simply showed a delay in pragmatic processing. For 
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example, they might not have generated a scalar inference by the time the critical word 
was encountered (leading to a pragmatic N400 effect) but such an inference may have 
been computed at some later point such that, at the sentence-final word, the pragmatic 
anomaly was registered. This account, however, is difficult to reconcile with the 
observation that these high AQ-Comm participants did show a differential ERP effect at 
the scalar quantifier itself.  
An alternative explanation is that, the high AQ-Comm participants did register the 
pragmatic meaning of the word ‘some’, but strategically ignored or inhibited the resulting 
pragmatic meaning of the scalar statements at the point of the critical word, and focused 
on the logical meaning of the sentences instead, perhaps based on their observation that 
standard conversational norms in Experiment 1 were repeatedly violated (see Guasti et 
al., for a similar suggestion). This latter explanation is similar to what has been proposed 
to explain individual differences in logical reasoning tasks, namely that some people are 
simply better in temporarily ignoring or inhibiting their pragmatic knowledge in order to 
focus on the logical reasoning requirements of a task (see Feeney et al., 2004; Handley & 
Feeney, in press; Stanovich & West, 2000). The fact that the high, but not low, AQ-
Comm group showed a differential ERP response to the scalar quantifiers could be taken 
as consistent with such an account. These early ERP effects may have reflected the active 
´undoing´ of the automatic access to the pragmatic meaning of ‘some’. 
These conclusions, however, are only speculative, and dedicated follow-up 
experiments are needed to examine the functional significance of the observed ERP 
differences the scalar quantifiers. One possible prediction is that high AQ-Comm people 
are also more likely to respond ´true´ to underinformative statements in a sentence-
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verification paradigm (but see Pijnacker et al., 2008) and that this behavioral outcome is 
heralded by ERP responses to the scalar quantifiers. 
Although our experiments were not optimized for investigating this issue and our 
conclusions are necessarily post-hoc, the ERP modulations at the scalar quantifiers might 
be taken to reflect pragmatic processing that took place before encountering the critical 
words. Although the nature of the differential effect of quantifier differed between 
Experiment 1 and 2, in both experiments there was a near-significant correlation between 
the differential effect of quantifier and the differential effect at the critical words. This 
correlation should be interpreted with caution, however, because it could be the case that 
larger overall ERP amplitudes also generate larger differential effects, which may 
confound the examination of a relationship between two ERP difference scores. 
Nevertheless, one tentative conclusion could be that scalar quantifiers can rapidly evoke 
scalar inferences that guide expectations about upcoming words based on the pragmatic 
presumption of informativeness, and, as a result, influence downstream semantic 
processes. 
 
A dynamic interplay between levels of processing, as indexed by the N400 
In addition to the pragmatic effect of (under)informativeness, this paper has also 
highlighted two other influences on semantic processes as indexed by the N400: the 
effects of lexico-semantic co-occurrence, and the effect of real world knowledge. 
Previous studies have shown that all these factors can independently influence the 
modulation of the N400, and that, when they all support the same interpretation, they can 
act in parallel to facilitate processing (e.g., Ditman, Holcomb & Kuperberg, 2007b; 
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Federmeier & Kutas, 1999). A key question, however, is which of these factors prevail 
when they are in conflict with one another. There are reports of lexical-semantic 
associations overriding any effect of pragmatic constraints on the N400 (e.g, Fischler et 
al., 1983; Kounios & Holcomb, 1992; Noveck & Posada, 2003), but this seems to be the 
case only in pragmatically infelicitous sentences (see Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008, for 
discussion). Lexico-semantic associations can, under other circumstances, also 
temporarily dominate processing of implausible sentences and discourse, with delayed 
effects observable within a late positivity/P600 time window (e.g., Kuperberg, Sitnikova, 
Caplan, & Holcomb, 2003; Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2005; for review see Kuperberg, 
2007). However, in a recent study, we showed that causal coherence across sentences can 
modulate the N400, even when semantic relationships between individual words are 
matched (Kuperberg et al., in press). The evidence thus points towards a dynamic 
interplay between different levels of processing, with each level of processing being 
influenced by a range of relevant factors. In the current study, we have shown that 
pragmatic licensing can override lexical-semantic co-occurrence in some individuals but 
not in others. Moreover, we have shown that differences in linguistic focus can shift the 
balance from ‘full-fledged’, higher-order compositional processing to processing driven 
by lexical-semantic relationships (e.g., Ferreira et al., 2002; Sanford & Garrod, 1998; 
Sanford & Sturt, 2002). Taken together, these observations provide further evidence for a 
dynamic interplay between lexical-semantic, pragmatic and neuropsychological factors 
during online sentence comprehension. 
 
Conclusion 
 59 
A major feat of human cognition is our ability to use language to efficiently 
communicate about the world. Mapping an incoming message about the world onto our 
world knowledge involves at least two aspects: the message can be true or false with 
respect to what we hold to be true, and it can be relatively informative or trivial in the 
light of what we already know. In the case of scalar statements, this means that logical-
structural meaning of the scalar quantifier needs to be combined with our real-world 
knowledge, our pragmatic knowledge of what constitutes a trivial or informative thing to 
say, and our individual tendencies to rely more on logic or pragmatic aspects of language. 
In the current study, we provide ERP evidence that all these factors exert their influence 
during on-line language comprehension. 
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TABLE 1 
Examples sentences from Experiment 1. Critical words are underlined for expository 
purpose only. 
Underinformative/Informative 
Some people have lungs/pets, which require good care. 
Some rock bands have musicians/groupies, sometimes with drug problems. 
Some gangs have members/initiations, and often strong hierarchy too. 
Relatively poor/good semantic fit 
Literature classes sometimes read papers/poems as a class. 
Wine and spirits contain sugar/alcohol in different amounts. 
Fillers 
Many people catch the flu, especially in the winter. 
Many vegetarians eat bean curd, which is rich in protein. 
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TABLE 2 
Examples sentences from Experiment 2. Critical words are underlined for expository 
purpose only. 
Underinformative/Informative 
Some people have lungs/pets that are diseased by viruses. 
Some rock bands have musicians/groupies with real drug problems. 
Some gangs have members/initiations that are really violent. 
Relatively poor/good semantic fit 
Literature classes sometimes read papers/poems as a class. 
Wine and spirits contain sugar/alcohol in different amounts. 
Fillers 
Many people catch the flu in the winter. 
Many vegetarians eat bean curd as a source of protein. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Left panel: Grand-average event-related potential (ERP) waveforms elicited by 
critical words in underinformative (dotted lines) and informative (solid lines) statements 
from Experiment 1, shown at electrode locations Cz, Pz, and Oz. In this and all following 
figures, negativity is plotted upwards. Middle panel: Grand average ERPs elicited by 
critical words in underinformative and informative statements per AQ Communication 
group in Experiment 1, and corresponding scalp distributions of the mean difference 
effect (underinformative minus informative sentences) in the 350- to 450 ms analysis 
window. Right panel: Correlation between N400 effect and AQ Communication score. 
 
Figure 2. Grand average ERPs elicited by sentence-final words in underinformative 
(dotted lines) and informative (solid lines) statements per AQ Communication group in 
Experiment 1, shown at electrode locations FPz, Cz, and Oz, and corresponding scalp 
distributions of the mean difference effect (underinformative minus informative 
sentences) in the 300- to 500 ms and the 500- to 700 ms analysis window. 
 
Figure 3. Left panel: Grand average ERPs elicited by words that had a relatively poor 
(dotted lines) and relatively good (solid lines) semantic fit per AQ Communication group 
in Experiment 1, and corresponding scalp distributions. Right panel: Correlation between 
N400 effect and AQ Communication score. 
 
Figure 4. Left panel: Grand-average ERPs elicited by critical words in underinformative 
(dotted lines) and informative (solid lines) statements from Experiment 2. Right panel: 
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Grand average ERPs elicited by critical words in underinformative and informative 
statements per AQ Communication group in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 5. Grand average ERPs elicited by sentence-final words in underinformative 
(dotted lines) and informative (solid lines) statements per AQ Communication group in 
Experiment 2, shown at electrode locations FPz, Cz, and Oz. 
 
Figure 6. Left panel: Grand average ERPs elicited by words that had a relatively poor 
(dotted lines) and relatively good (solid lines) semantic fit per AQ Communication group 
in Experiment 2 and corresponding scalp distributions. Right panel: Correlation between 
N400 effect and AQ Communication score.
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